Unveiling North Korea's Covert IT Workforce: Stories from the Shadows of Surveillance**

In a rare interview, a former North Korean IT worker reveals the extensive scheme of using fake identities for remote work to raise funds for the regime, with the operation thriving amid international sanctions and exploiting the pandemic's remote working culture.**

Jin-su, a defector from North Korea, recently shared his harrowing experiences as an undercover IT worker sent abroad to generate revenues for the regime. Utilizing a network of fake IDs, he managed to secure various remote jobs with Western companies, earning around $5,000 a month, with the larger portion of his income funneled back to support North Korea. This operation encompasses thousands of North Korean workers dispatched to countries like China, Russia, and elsewhere, operating under stringent surveillance yet managing to contribute significantly to the regime's finances.

In an interview with the BBC, Jin-su, whose identity has been concealed for his safety, detailed how 85% of his earnings were sent back home, supporting a regime struggling under international sanctions. "It’s like robbery, but it’s preferable to our lives back in North Korea," he stated. An alarming UN report estimates that these operations can generate $250 million to $600 million annually for the state. As remote working surged during the pandemic, the scheme became more lucrative, with some workers even engaging in cybercrimes like data theft and extortion from their employers.

During his years of covert work in China, Jin-su revealed how vital it was to disguise his identity. By posing as a Chinese national, he networked with citizens from various countries, primarily targeting those in the UK to borrow identities necessary for job applications. "If you put an 'Asian face' on that profile, you’ll never get a job," he explained. Many North Koreans share this fate, with a significant number inadvertently finding themselves employed by the same companies.

The BBC's investigation uncovered suspicions among hiring managers in cybersecurity sectors who commonly encounter candidates they believe to be North Koreans engaged in fraudulent identities. Rob Henley, co-founder of Ally Security, recounted how his firm unwittingly interviewed numerous North Korean applicants, highlighting the ongoing challenge of identifying these covert workers.

Moreover, while 100,000 North Koreans are reportedly employed abroad in various capacities, Jin-su's experience stands out as he recognized the pressing need for change during his time overseas. The limited access to information in North Korea contrasts sharply with the availability of Western media when working abroad, often leading workers to reassess their predicament.

Despite the oppressive environment, the defector revealed that few colleagues even consider escaping. Many are financially motivated to return home, where their lower earnings resonate with the country’s economy. Jin-su acknowledged the risks associated with defecting, including the possibility of eternal separation from family and repercussions against loved ones left behind.

Now settled in a new life, Jin-su continues to use his IT skills, albeit under legal employment conditions. "Working hard and keeping what I earn feels immensely rewarding compared to my previous life," he concluded. His account sheds light on an unseen world, elaborating on the hidden strategies employed by North Koreans seeking to navigate economic hardship while remaining connected to their homeland’s oppressive regime.