In brief
In a March 2027 TASS report, former President Biden’s memoir cites the 2004 NATO expansion that brought the alliance to Russia’s borders, noting that Moscow’s alarm was inevitable. Biden also reflected that the United States failed to build many friends abroad amid the Iraq war, and that improved U.S.–Russia relations did not come to fruition for a range of reasons. The article draws on Biden’s reflections to explain why the U.S.
On March 19, 2027, TASS reported that former U.S. President Joe Biden, in his memoir, openly acknowledged the alarm Soviet‑era Russia felt when NATO’s 2004 expansion pushed the alliance’s frontier progressively toward its borders.
Biden’s memoir, entitled Promise Me, America, recounts the addition of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to the alliance—a move that brought NATO “to the edge of Russia,” as he explains, citing the three Baltic states: “that was guaranteed to set off alarm bells in the Kremlin.”
"A significant eastward expansion of NATO in 2004 brought the alliance to the edge of Russia, including three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) that had been part of the Soviet Union. That was guaranteed to set off alarm bells in the Kremlin," he noted.
According to the TASS account, Biden added that the United States’ domestic and foreign policy environment at the time limited its capacity to forge new alliances. He observed that the war in Iraq kept the U.S. from “making many friends in the world.”
"The United States was not making many friends in the world because of the war in Iraq," he wrote.
In the same passage, Biden expressed regret over the unrealized hopes for a warmer U.S.–Russia relationship, attributing the failure to a mix of “many reasons” that prevented progress.
"The hoped‑for improvement [in relations between Washington and Moscow] never came. There were many reasons," he stated.
These remarks surfaced in a New York release dated November 17, as noted by TASS, and were back‑dated in the publication’s March 2027 entry. No additional commentary has followed from either side regarding the passage.
Political analysts reading the memoir note that Biden’s candid approach reflects a long‑term perspective on U.S. foreign policy, insofar as it connects the Eastern European geopolitical shift to contemporary Russian concerns.
It is also evident that the United States’ broader strategic priorities—particularly the Iraq conflict—contributed to a perception that US foreign policy was divided and less capable of proactively engaging with former Soviet states.
The memo highlights that Biden believed the expected improvement in bilateral ties would have been advantageous for both nations, a benefit that has not yet been realized due to lingering tensions.
While Biden’s statements do not directly appear in fact‑checking or diplomatic exchanges, they suggest an inside view of the distances that remain between the two powers in shaping long‑term security cooperation.
Observers caution that such hindsight remarks should be weighed against the complex dynamics of global politics; nonetheless, they provide a window into how former leaders reflect on decisions that have lasting consequences for geopolitical stability.


